The Bomber Campaign
1942 - 1945
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Module objective: Guided by both research and inquiry-based questions, students will explore the ethical dimension of the bomber campaign by considering the historical perspectives found in the primary sources available and tracing the causes and consequences of this campaign.
Intended audience: Grades 10-12 Primary HTC addressed: The Ethical Dimension Secondary HTCs addressed: Historical Perspectives; Cause and Consequence |
Interested in combining the Lest We Forget project with some activities from this module? Here are links to the service files of two soldiers whose individual stories connect with this module’s topic:
Flying Officer Ralph Perry Davies Flight Lieutenant George Theodore Berg |
Problem overview
Contemporaries and modern scholars debated the morality of the bomber campaign and its utility. For many – then as now – the systematic targeting of German cities and their people was and remains morally indefensible, and meant that the Allies were no better than the evil they fought. Others – then as now – argued that the bombing campaign was a very reasonable response to German terror bombing of British cities, and the only way in which the Allies could effectively strike back. At the very least, it opened a “second front” in the air in support of the Russians.
Still others – then as now – argued that the bomber campaign absorbed too much effort for too few results. The wholesale destruction of German cities from the air only occurred as Allied armies approached the German borders in late 1944. Figures for the scale of industrial effort to build and sustain a massive bomber fleet range anywhere from 7% to nearly 50% of Britain’s industrial capacity, and the crews syphoned off the best and brightest men from the other services. Some argue that if the same resources had been applied to army and navy operations the war would have ended sooner. Debate over the utility of strategic bombing and its ability to end wars quickly was clouded by 1945 by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which did force Japan to surrender.
Still others – then as now – argued that the bomber campaign absorbed too much effort for too few results. The wholesale destruction of German cities from the air only occurred as Allied armies approached the German borders in late 1944. Figures for the scale of industrial effort to build and sustain a massive bomber fleet range anywhere from 7% to nearly 50% of Britain’s industrial capacity, and the crews syphoned off the best and brightest men from the other services. Some argue that if the same resources had been applied to army and navy operations the war would have ended sooner. Debate over the utility of strategic bombing and its ability to end wars quickly was clouded by 1945 by the atomic bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which did force Japan to surrender.
Problem background
The idea of winning a war through direct attack on the enemy’s ability – or willingness – to wage war was a powerful influence on air force planning prior to 1939. In fact, two German bombing campaigns against Britain in 1915-1917, resulted in the establishment of Great Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) as a separate service in 1918 to put that idea into practice. When Germany attacked British cities again during the “Blitz” of 1940-1941, the British resolved to strike back on a massive scale.
Initial British attempts to conduct “strategic bombing” against industrial and military targets in 1939-1941 were failures. Bomb loads and aircraft were too small, accuracy was poor, and losses during daylight raids prohibitive. When the British turned to night-time bombing losses plummeted, but bombing accuracy was appalling: scarcely 5% of bombs feel within 8 kms of the target. In 1941 the British began to build-up a massive fleet of powerful four-engine bombers capable of delivering huge bomb loads in a single raid. In February 1942 they also began targeting whole urban areas of German cities in an attempt to break the will of the German people. Incendiary bombs became an increasingly important tool in this campaign to burn German cities to the ground. In 1942 the Americans, who shared the RAF's passion for strategic bombing, joined-in, flying in daylight in theoretically self-defending formations and attacking key industrial targets.
A sustained Allied aerial assault against Germany began in 1943 with the “Combined Bomber Offensive” – the Americans by day and the British Commonwealth by night. Despite some dramatic incidents, like the burning of Hamburg in June 1943, aircraft losses remained high and the results still poor. It was only after the summer of 1944, by which time the German air defences were seriously weakened and the Allied bomber fleets were huge, that the bombing campaign peaked: 70% of all bombs dropped on Germany fell after 1 September 1944. With over 4,000 four-engine bombers available daily for raids, the destructive power of the Allied bomber force was immense. It culminated with the burning of Dresden in February 1945, in which some 80,000 people are estimated to have died.
The RCAF
The RCAF was a major participant in the RAF’s strategic bombing campaign. In early 1943 all eleven RCAF bomber squadrons were gathered into “No 6 Group, RCAF” of Bomber Command: the largest and most important formation of aircraft built, operated and commanded by Canada during the war. The final number of RCAF squadrons in No 6 Group was thirteen, operating over 200 heavy, four-engine “Halifax” and “Lancaster” bombers. No 6 Group represented a quarter of Bomber Command dedicated bombing groups. Other Canadian squadrons, such as 405 Sqn, served in the “Pathfinder” Group that marked targets. The RCAF also operated four night fighter squadrons that both defended Britain and often flew in support of bombing operations, attacking German night fighters which tried to shoot down the bombers. There were also an enormous number of Canadians in RAF squadrons, where they made-up about 25% of the aircrew.
Losses of personnel on bomber operations were high, especially in 1942-43 when aircrew survival rates hovered around 25%, and during the so-called “Battle of Berlin” in the winter of 1944. Because the RCAF squadrons were formed late, they tended to operate older types of aircraft while other squadrons flew higher and faster in newer types. As a result, Canadian losses were occasionally high, and on several occasions RCAF bomber squadrons had to be diverted to less risky tasks until their turn for better aircraft arrived.
Canada made a commitment to the air war in 1939 (See module: Canadians and the Global War in the Air), in the expectation of low casualties. In the end, over 10,000 Canadian airmen died in the bomber campaign: one quarter of Canada’s combat deaths during the war.
Initial British attempts to conduct “strategic bombing” against industrial and military targets in 1939-1941 were failures. Bomb loads and aircraft were too small, accuracy was poor, and losses during daylight raids prohibitive. When the British turned to night-time bombing losses plummeted, but bombing accuracy was appalling: scarcely 5% of bombs feel within 8 kms of the target. In 1941 the British began to build-up a massive fleet of powerful four-engine bombers capable of delivering huge bomb loads in a single raid. In February 1942 they also began targeting whole urban areas of German cities in an attempt to break the will of the German people. Incendiary bombs became an increasingly important tool in this campaign to burn German cities to the ground. In 1942 the Americans, who shared the RAF's passion for strategic bombing, joined-in, flying in daylight in theoretically self-defending formations and attacking key industrial targets.
A sustained Allied aerial assault against Germany began in 1943 with the “Combined Bomber Offensive” – the Americans by day and the British Commonwealth by night. Despite some dramatic incidents, like the burning of Hamburg in June 1943, aircraft losses remained high and the results still poor. It was only after the summer of 1944, by which time the German air defences were seriously weakened and the Allied bomber fleets were huge, that the bombing campaign peaked: 70% of all bombs dropped on Germany fell after 1 September 1944. With over 4,000 four-engine bombers available daily for raids, the destructive power of the Allied bomber force was immense. It culminated with the burning of Dresden in February 1945, in which some 80,000 people are estimated to have died.
The RCAF
The RCAF was a major participant in the RAF’s strategic bombing campaign. In early 1943 all eleven RCAF bomber squadrons were gathered into “No 6 Group, RCAF” of Bomber Command: the largest and most important formation of aircraft built, operated and commanded by Canada during the war. The final number of RCAF squadrons in No 6 Group was thirteen, operating over 200 heavy, four-engine “Halifax” and “Lancaster” bombers. No 6 Group represented a quarter of Bomber Command dedicated bombing groups. Other Canadian squadrons, such as 405 Sqn, served in the “Pathfinder” Group that marked targets. The RCAF also operated four night fighter squadrons that both defended Britain and often flew in support of bombing operations, attacking German night fighters which tried to shoot down the bombers. There were also an enormous number of Canadians in RAF squadrons, where they made-up about 25% of the aircrew.
Losses of personnel on bomber operations were high, especially in 1942-43 when aircrew survival rates hovered around 25%, and during the so-called “Battle of Berlin” in the winter of 1944. Because the RCAF squadrons were formed late, they tended to operate older types of aircraft while other squadrons flew higher and faster in newer types. As a result, Canadian losses were occasionally high, and on several occasions RCAF bomber squadrons had to be diverted to less risky tasks until their turn for better aircraft arrived.
Canada made a commitment to the air war in 1939 (See module: Canadians and the Global War in the Air), in the expectation of low casualties. In the end, over 10,000 Canadian airmen died in the bomber campaign: one quarter of Canada’s combat deaths during the war.
Key questions and debates
The three student activities in this module are designed to address the key questions and debates surrounding the topic, and are framed by the guideposts to historical thinking for each of the historical thinking concepts addressed in the module. Activities are intended to be completed in order. Please click below to see an activity overview, guiding questions, and additional topics/questions the teacher may introduce.
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Students will catalog and compare the historical and contemporary arguments regarding the justification of the bomber campaign.
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Students will track the strategic bombing efforts from 1939 and create a chronology of the bomber campaign.
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Students will read international law documents on the bombing of civilians and present an assessment of these.
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Culminating activity/assessment
Students will write a proposal for the next international agreement on the bombing of civilians, using an historical argument to frame the proposed resolutions.
Students demonstrating sophisticated thinking will be able to explain why these past events are important to remember in the present, and will be able to express an emerging understanding of the effects of the bomber campaign. Students should also be able to articulate through this module their understanding that while the past does not teach us direct lessons, we can use what we know of the past to judge current issues, and should be able to express emerging yet informed opinions on the bombing of civilians in wartime.
We encourage the use of The Historical Thinking Project resources in addition to Provincial curricular recommendations to assess student thinking in this module.
Students demonstrating sophisticated thinking will be able to explain why these past events are important to remember in the present, and will be able to express an emerging understanding of the effects of the bomber campaign. Students should also be able to articulate through this module their understanding that while the past does not teach us direct lessons, we can use what we know of the past to judge current issues, and should be able to express emerging yet informed opinions on the bombing of civilians in wartime.
We encourage the use of The Historical Thinking Project resources in addition to Provincial curricular recommendations to assess student thinking in this module.
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